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Problem Definition
An instance I of the Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) [6, 7, 15] involves a set R =
{r1, . . . , rn} of residents and a set H = {h1, . . . , hm} of hospitals. Each hospital hj ∈ H
has a positive integral capacity, denoted by cj . Also, each resident ri ∈ R has a preference
list in which he ranks in strict order a subset of H. A pair (ri, hj) ∈ R ×H is said to be
acceptable if hj appears in ri’s preference list; in this case ri is said to find hj acceptable.
Similarly each hospital hj ∈ H has a preference list in which it ranks in strict order those
residents who find hj acceptable. Given any three agents x, y, z ∈ R ∪ H, x is said to
prefer y to z if x finds each of y and z acceptable, and y precedes z on x’s preference list.
Let C =
∑
hj∈H
cj .
Let A denote the set of acceptable pairs in I, and let L = |A|. An assignment M
is a subset of A. If (ri, hj) ∈ M , ri is said to be assigned to hj , and hj is assigned ri.
For each q ∈ R ∪ H, the set of assignees of q in M is denoted by M(q). If ri ∈ R and
M(ri) = ∅, ri is said to be unassigned, otherwise ri is assigned. Similarly, any hospital
hj ∈ H is under-subscribed, full or over-subscribed according as |M(hj)| is less than, equal
to, or greater than cj , respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that |M(ri)| ≤ 1 for each ri ∈ R and |M(hj)| ≤ cj
for each hj ∈ H (i.e., no resident is assigned to an unacceptable hospital, each resident
is assigned to at most one hospital, and no hospital is over-subscribed). For notational
convenience, given a matching M and a resident ri ∈ R such that M(ri) 6= ∅, where there
is no ambiguity the notation M(ri) is also used to refer to the single member of M(ri).
A pair (ri, hj) ∈ A\M blocks a matching M , or is a blocking pair forM , if the following
conditions are satisfied relative to M :
1. ri is unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri);
2. hj is under-subscribed or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj) (or both).
A matching M is said to be stable if it admits no blocking pair. Given an instance I of
HR, the problem is to find a stable matching in I.
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M := ∅;
while (some resident ri is unassigned and ri has a non-empty list) {
hj := first hospital on ri’s list;
/* ri applies to hj */
M := M ∪ {(ri, hj)};
if (hj is over-subscribed) {
rk := worst resident in M(hj) according to hj ’s list;
M := M\{(rk, hj)};
}
if (hj is full) {
rk := worst resident in M(hj) according to hj ’s list;
for (each successor rl of rk on hj ’s list)
delete the pair (rl, hj);
}
}
Figure 1: Gale/Shapley algorithm for HR.
Key Results
HR was first defined by Gale and Shapley [6] under the name “College Admissions Prob-
lem”. In their seminal paper, the authors’ primary consideration is the classical Stable
Marriage problem (SM; see Entries “Stable Marriage” and “Optimal Stable Marriage”),
which is a special case of HR in which n = m, A = R ×H, and cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H –
in this case, the residents and hospitals are more commonly referred to as the men and
women respectively. Gale and Shapley showed that every instance I of HR admits at
least one stable matching. Their proof of this result is constructive, i.e., an algorithm
for finding a stable matching in I is described. This algorithm has become known as the
Gale/Shapley algorithm.
An extended version of the Gale/Shapley algorithm for HR is shown in Figure 1. The
algorithm involves a sequence of apply and delete operations. At each iteration of the
while loop, some unassigned resident ri with a non-empty preference list applies to the
first hospital hj on his list, and becomes provisionally assigned to hj (this assignment could
subsequently be broken). If hj becomes over-subscribed as a result of this assignment, then
hj rejects its worst assigned resident rk. Next, if hj is full (irrespective of whether hj was
over-subscribed earlier in the same loop iteration), then for each resident rl that hj finds
less desirable than its worst assigned resident rk, the algorithm deletes the pair (rl, hj),
which comprises deleting hj from rl’s preference list and vice versa.
Given that the above algorithm involves residents applying to hospitals, it has become
known as the Resident-oriented Gale/Shapley algorithm, or RGS algorithm for short [7,
Section 1.6.3]. The RGS algorithm terminates with a stable matching, given an instance
of HR [6] [7, Theorem 1.6.2]. Using a suitable choice of data structures (extending those
described in [7, Section 1.2.3]), the RGS algorithm can be implemented to run in O(L)
time. This algorithm produces the unique stable matching that is simultaneously best-
possible for all residents [6] [7, Theorem 1.6.2]. These observations may be summarized
as follows:
Theorem 1. Given an instance of HR, the RGS algorithm constructs, in O(L) time, the
unique stable matching in which each assigned resident obtains the best hospital that he
could obtain in any stable matching, whilst each unassigned resident is unassigned in every
stable matching.
A counterpart of the RGS algorithm, known as the Hospital-oriented Gale/Shapley
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algorithm, or HGS algorithm for short [7, Section 1.6.2], gives the unique stable matching
that similarly satisfies an optimality property for the hospitals [7, Theorem 1.6.1].
Although there may be many stable matchings for a given instance I of HR, some key
structural properties hold regarding unassigned residents and under-subscribed hospitals
with respect to all stable matchings in I, as follows.
Theorem 2. For a given instance of HR,
• the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings;
• each hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings;
• any hospital that is under-subscribed in one stable matching is assigned exactly the
same set of residents in all stable matchings.
These results are collectively known as the “Rural Hospitals Theorem” (see [7, Section
1.6.4] for further details). Furthermore, the set of stable matchings in I forms a distributive
lattice under a natural dominance relation [7, Section 1.6.5].
Applications
Practical applications of HR are widespread, most notably arising in the context of cen-
tralized automated matching schemes that assign applicants to posts (for example medical
students to hospitals, school-leavers to universities, and primary school pupils to secondary
schools). Perhaps the largest and best-known example of such a scheme is the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the US [17], which annually assigns around 31,000
graduating medical students (known as residents) to their first hospital posts, taking into
account the preferences of residents over hospitals and vice versa, and the hospital capac-
ities. Counterparts of the NRMP are in existence in other countries, including Canada
[18] and Japan [19]. These matching schemes essentially employ extensions of the RGS
algorithm for HR.
Centralized matching schemes based largely on HR also occur in other practical con-
texts, such as school placement in New York [1], university faculty recruitment in France [3]
and university admission in Spain [13]. Further applications are described in [12, Section
1.3.7].
Indeed, the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded in 2012 to Alvin Roth and
Lloyd Shapley, partly for their theoretical work on HR and its variants [6, 15], and partly
for their contribution to the widespread deployment of algorithms for HR in practical
settings such as junior doctor allocation as noted above.
Extensions of HR
One key extension of HR that has considerable practical importance arises when an in-
stance may involve a set of couples, each of which submits a joint preference list over pairs
of hospitals (typically in order that the members of the couple can be located geograph-
ically close to one another). The extension of HR in which couples may be involved is
denoted by HRC; the stability definition in HRC is a natural extension of that in HR (see
[12, Section 5.3] for a formal definition of HRC). It is known that an instance of HRC
need not admit a stable matching (see [4]). Moreover, the problem of deciding whether
an HRC instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete [14].
HR may be regarded as a many-one generalization of SM. A further generalization of
SM is to a many-many stable matching problem, in which both residents and hospitals
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may be multiply assigned subject to capacity constraints. In this case, residents and
hospitals are more commonly referred to as workers and firms respectively. There are two
basic variations of the many-many stable matching problem according to whether workers
rank (i) individual acceptable firms in order of preference and vice versa, or (ii) acceptable
subsets of firms in order of preference and vice versa. Previous work relating to both
models is surveyed in [12, Section 5.4].
Other variants of HR may be obtained if preference lists include ties. This extension
is again important from a practical perspective, since it may be unrealistic to expect a
popular hospital to rank a large number of applicants in strict order, particularly if it is
indifferent among groups of applicants. The extension of HR in which preference lists may
include ties is denoted by HRT. In this context three natural stability definitions arise, so-
called weak stability, strong stability and super-stability (see [12, Section 1.3.5] for formal
definitions of these concepts). Given an instance I of HRT, it is known that weakly stable
matchings may have different sizes, and the problem of finding a maximum cardinality
weakly stable matching is NP-hard (see Entry “Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete
Lists” for further details). On the other hand, in contrast to the case for weak stability,
a super-stable matching in I need not exist, though there is an O(L) algorithm to find a
such a matching if one does [8]. Analogous results hold in the case of strong stability – in
this case an O(L2) algorithm [10] was improved by an O(CL) algorithm [11] and extended
to the many-many case [5]. Furthermore, counterparts of the Rural Hospitals Theorem
hold for HRT under each of the super-stability and strong stability criteria [8, 16].
A further generalization of HR arises when each hospital may be split into several
departments, where each department has a capacity, and residents rank individual depart-
ments in order of preference. This variant is modelled by the Student-Project Allocation
problem [12, Section 5.5]. Finally, the Hospitals / Residents problem under Social Stability
[2] is an extension of HR in which an instance is augmented by a social network graph G
(a bipartite graph whose vertices correspond to residents and hospitals, and whose edges
form a subset of A) such that a blocking pair must additionally satisfy the property that it
forms an edge of G. Edges in G correspond to resident–hospital pairs that are acquainted
with one another, and therefore more likely to block a matching in practice.
Open Problems
As noted in Section “Applications”, ties in the hospitals’ preference lists may arise natu-
rally in practical applications. In an HRT instance weak stability is the most commonly-
studied stability criterion, due to the guaranteed existence of such a matching. Attempting
to match as many residents as possible motivates the search for large weakly stable match-
ings. Several approximation algorithms for finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable
matching have been formulated (see “Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete Lists”
and [12, Section 3.2.6] for further details). It remains open to find tighter upper and lower
bounds for the approximability of this problem.
URL to Code
Ada implementations of the RGS and HGS algorithms for HR may be found via the
following URL: http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/research/algorithms/stable.
Cross References
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